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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Incarcerated in a federal detention center1 for over two years and 
awaiting deportation to his native Mexico, Ricardo Oviedo-Cortez dreamed 
of once again walking his then seven-year old daughter to school as a 
free man in the United States of America, the country he called home for 
almost thirty years.2  Oviedo-Cortez’s journey to federal confinement 
1. Oviedo-Cortez was detained at the CCA Detention Center, also commonly
referred to as the San Diego Detention Center.  The CCA is a privately run detention 
facility that temporarily houses noncitizen detainees pending their immigration proceeding 
under a contractual arrangement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 
See CCA Detention Center, SAN DIEGO IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://immigrantsandiego.org/2010/01/12/cca-detention-center/. 
2. See letter from Oviedo-Cortez to author (Mar. 15, 2012) (on file with author).
Oviedo-Cortez was raised in Tijuana, Mexico.  He first came to the United States as a 
teenager, but returned to Mexico to perform compulsory military service.  After another brief 
stay in the United Sates, Oviedo-Cortez again returned back to Mexico where he briefly 
worked as a Tijuana police officer.  In 1983, unable to make a sustainable living as a police 
officer because of his unwillingness to accept bribes and because the peso was then 
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began on the evening of December 2, 2009, when he entered a San 
Diego Wal-Mart with a forged Arizona driver’s license bearing the name 
Dr. Smith,3 a person whose identity had been stolen.  Oviedo-Cortez hoped 
to use this fabricated driver’s license to execute an emergency wire transfer 
from Dr. Smith’s American Express account.  Oviedo-Cortez walked up 
to the attendant at the Wal-Mart Money Gram counter and presented 
himself as Dr. Smith, but before he could complete the wire transfer, he 
was arrested and detained. 
Oviedo-Cortez pled guilty to one count of false personation under 
section 530.5(a) of the California Penal Code and was ultimately ordered 
to pay $1,000 in restitution4 and sentenced to 200 days of confinement.  
If Oviedo-Cortez were a United States citizen, he would have been able 
to return home following his state incarceration and carry on with his 
life.  However, because Oviedo-Cortez is a Mexican citizen (albeit a then 
legal permanent resident of the United States), the Department of Homeland 
Security [“DHS” or “Government”] initiated removal proceedings against 
Oviedo-Cortez immediately following his state incarceration, wrongfully 
claiming that his conviction was an aggravated felony, thus making 
Oviedo-Cortez removable from the United States.5 
As a result of the Government’s dogged pursuit of its unjust deportation 
claims, Oviedo-Cortez was detained and not released from custody until 
March 2012—two years later.  After enduring numerous legal proceedings 
before the immigration court, the Board of Immigration Appeals [“BIA”], 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Oviedo-Cortez was eventually 
able to return home to his family. 
The Government’s claimed linchpin for Oviedo-Cortez’s deportation 
and the resulting lengthy legal battle was an unsigned pre-sentencing 
report that proclaimed, with no detailed support, that Oviedo-Cortez’s 
actions resulted in approximately $24,000 in loss to an unidentified group of 
experiencing significant devaluations, Oviedo-Cortez again returned to the United States. 
In 2002, Oviedo-Cortez was granted lawful permanent residence status in the United 
States.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, 9, Oviedo-Cortez v. Holder, No. 11-70404 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 18, 2011). 
3. The real name is replaced with the pseudonym Smith.
4. In a non pro tunc order, the criminal trial court reduced the amount of
restitution from $24,000 to $1,000. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
5. According to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, any alien is removable if
convicted of an aggravated felony. Please note that the author intends to use the terms 
“alien” and “noncitizen” interchangeably. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
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victims.  That was all the evidence the Government offered to satisfy its 
burden that Oviedo-Cortez had, in fact, caused over $10,000 in loss, as 
required by section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act [“INA”].  There were no trial court orders, no admissions, and no other 
physical evidence of any kind to support the Government’s deportation 
allegations.  All the Government could produce was this one inherently 
untrustworthy document riddled with multiple layers of hearsay. 
One might wonder how the Government could lead the immigration 
judge and the BIA down such a path of clear error, especially since prior 
to 2009, most immigration courts would never have accepted a pre-
sentencing report as sufficient evidence to prove removability.6  Indeed, 
at one point in the proceedings, the immigration judge remarked to 
Oviedo-Cortez: 
[A]t this point, I do not believe the Government has sustained the charge that 
you have been convicted of an aggravated felony for fraud because there is 
nothing in [the Complaint or plea agreement] to indicate that the loss to the 
victim was $10,000 or more.7 
This journey of compounded error began with the Government’s 
tenacious insistence that the United States Supreme Court in 2009 somehow 
changed the playing field in favor of deportation by opening the floodgates 
to the admission of all evidence in the criminal record to assist in 
satisfying the Government’s burden of persuasion.  Thus, the Government 
successfully dangled a single unreliable document and its misinterpretation 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan v. Holder8 in front of the 
immigration judge and the BIA to justify Oviedo-Cortez’s detention and 
deportation. 
Finally, after an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Oviedo-Cortez’s prolonged 
legal fight came to end.9  Oviedo-Cortez’s opening brief filed before the 
Ninth Circuit forced the Government to come to grips with reality.  It 
was only then that the Government agreed to file a Joint Motion to Remand 
to the BIA, articulating that “[b]ecause the record does not support the 
conclusion that the crime for which [Oviedo-Cortez] was convicted 
resulted in a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, as required by the 
 
 6.  See Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Ochoa-Fernandez, 168 F. App’x. 291, 293 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Valenzuela- 
Hernandez, 72 F. App’x. 686, 686 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Varela-Marquez, 45 
F. App’x. 820, 820 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 7.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 14. 
 8.  See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009). 
 9.  The author, director of the University of San Diego School of Law Appellate 
Clinic, represented Oviedo-Cortez before the Ninth Circuit and upon remand to the BIA. 
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removal statute, remand to the [BIA] is appropriate.”10  On March 6, 2012, 
Oviedo-Cortez’s nightmare ended with the BIA’s order terminating the 
removal proceedings “[i]n light of the Ninth Circuit’s order and the parties’ 
joint motion” that Oviedo-Cortez is not removable as charged under 
section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA.11 
Unfortunately, Oviedo-Cortez’s situation is not an isolated incidence 
of Government overzealous deportation.  It is instead an example of an 
alarming trend in U.S. immigration courts.  With over 4,000 aliens deported 
in 2011 for “fraudulent activities” alone,12 we must all be watchful that 
the DHS adheres to the law and properly meets its burden of proof in all 
removal proceedings.13 
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the government’s 
misinterpretation of the central holding in Nijhawan v. Holder and how 
it has led to the improper dilution of evidentiary standards in removal 
proceedings when determining the $10,000 threshold loss requirement 
under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA [hereinafter “M(i)”].  Section II 
of this article provides a brief doctrinal overview and summary of my 
proposed procedural methodology; sections III and IV provide essential 
background information regarding the Supreme Court’s important pre-
Nijhawan opinions and the inconsistent methods circuit courts have applied 
when calculating the monetary threshold under the fraud or deceit 
deportation statute prior to Nijhawan; section V provides a detailed 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nijhawan; section VI analyzes 
post-Nijhawan cases and highlights the misapplication of the Nijhawan 
rule; and section VII discusses and articulates what evidence the 
immigration court should admit in a circumstance-specific analysis when 
determining the loss during a deportation proceeding. 
 
 10.  Joint Motion to Remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Oveido-Cortez 
v. Holder, No. 11-70404 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012). 
 11.  Matter of Oviedo-Cortez, 2012 WL 911867, at *1 (B.I.A. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 12.  JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY SAPP, ANNUAL REPORT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2011, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, at 6. (Sept. 20, 2012), http:// 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. 
 13.  Under the INA, the government bears the burden of proving, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that a legal permanent resident is deportable. INA        
§ 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012); 8 CFR § 1240.8(a) (2012). 




II.  DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED 
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 
The INA dictates that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”14  Federal immigration 
law also proscribes the Attorney General from, in any way, “granting 
discretionary relief from removal to an aggravated felon, no matter how 
compelling his case.”15  This statutory scheme defines “aggravated felony” 
by setting out a long list of enumerated crimes, one of which is any 
“offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or 
victims exceeds $10,000.”16 
The INA fails to “prescribe a detailed methodology for determining 
whether a predicate offense fits within these definitions (and, thus, qualifies 
as an aggravated felony).”17  In the absence of statutory direction, the 
federal circuits and the immigration courts routinely, albeit inconsistently, 
apply some form of the Supreme Court’s categorical approach as conceived 
in Taylor v. United States,18 to determine precisely when a prior conviction 
qualifies as an aggravated felony within the meaning of the INA.19 
In 2009, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nijhawan v. Holder attempted 
to resolve the inconsistencies that had emerged in immigration courts 
 
 14.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 15.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013). 
 16.  INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012). 
 17.  Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 18.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). The Taylor categorical approach 
has properly served as guidance for the immigration courts because, like the sentencing 
court in Taylor, an immigration court can only “act within an administrative system 
addressing the federal statutory consequences of convictions that criminal court judges 
have already adjudicated.” Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1675–
76 (2011). 
 19.  Conteh, 461 F.3d at 52; see also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 
185–86 (2007) (“In determining whether a conviction (say, a conviction for violating a 
state criminal law that forbids the taking of property without permission) falls within the 
scope of a listed offense (e.g., ‘theft offense’), the lower courts uniformly have applied 
the approach this Court set forth in Taylor v. United States.”). The categorical approach 
has been applied in the immigration context even before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Taylor. See Das, supra note 18, at 1688 (explaining the history of federal immigration 
law and the traditional use of the categorical analysis in the immigration context as “one 
that limited the immigration adjudicator’s assessment of a past criminal conviction to a 
legal analysis of the statutory offense rather than a review of the facts underlying the 
crime”); see also id. at 1749 (Appendix containing decisions of pre-Taylor federal courts, 
including Attorney General and Board of Immigration Appeals decisions demonstrating 
the history of categorical analysis in immigration law). 
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and federal circuit courts across the country as to how to determine the 
financial threshold under M(i) (the aggravated felony provision for “fraud 
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”).  
Not surprisingly, in Nijhawan, the Government wanted the Court to 
abandon the categorical approach in favor of a method wherein any and 
all information found in the criminal defendant’s file could be used to 
show damages exceeding $10,000.20  The petitioner, on the other hand, 
wanted the Court to keep the categorical approach and only allow 
aggravated felony status if the monetary threshold was actually part of 
the conviction itself.21 
In Nijhawan, the Court rejected all forms of the categorical approach 
in favor of a circumstance-specific analysis when determining the monetary 
threshold contained in this INA section.  Unlike the categorical approach, 
which has always prevented immigration courts from looking “‘to the 
facts of the particular prior case,’”22 the circumstance-specific approach 
allows for an examination, in immigration court, of the “particular  
circumstances in which an offender committed the crime on a particular 
occasion.”23  Regrettably, the Court’s opinion, narrow in parts and vague 
in others, has led to an even more inconsistent and questionable application 
of immigration law.  The Government believes that once the Supreme Court 
rejected the categorical approach for determining the monetary threshold, 
the Court also somehow declared “open season” on hunting down and 
using any information from the criminal defendant’s file.  A close 
examination of the Nijhawan opinion rejects the Government’s overly 
broad interpretation. 
I suggest a balanced, straightforward four-phase procedural framework 
for how to properly litigate the monetary threshold question for deportation 
purposes under M(i).  When creating such litigation methodology, two 
paramount principles must guide our way.  First, the government must be 
given a fair opportunity to satisfy its burdens of production and persuasion 
 
 20.  Brief for Respondent at 12, 34–43, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) 
(No. 08-495). 
 21.  At oral argument, Justice Souter summed up the petitioner’s argument as 
follows: “So it seems to me that you’ve got to go the whole hog or get nothing, and the 
whole hog is that it’s got to be an element of the offense that the loss exceed $10,000.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (No. 08-
495). 
 22.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 
549 U.S. at 186). 
 23.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38–40. 
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that the dollar threshold under M(i) has been met, consistent with due 
process to the alien, considerations of fairness, and Supreme Court dictates; 
and second, the alien must be given a fair opportunity to dispute the 
government’s argument that the monetary threshold has been satisfied. 
Phase One: The government must present to the immigration judge 
credible evidence from the underlying criminal file documenting loss to 
the victim or victims of an amount greater than $10,000.  Failure to come 
forward with such evidence mandates a dismissal of the government’s 
aggravated felony deportation charge under M(i), because the government 
carries the burden on this issue. 
I fully recognize that for a proper calculation of the amount of loss in 
a circumstance-specific analysis in a fraud or deceit crime, as compared 
with a pure categorical or modified categorical approach, the criminal 
element focus is discarded and evidentiary standards are somewhat relaxed.  
However, common sense and Supreme Court authority neither (a) 
sanctions the use of unreliable information found in the alien’s criminal 
file as grounds for deportation, nor (b) sanctions an entirely new 
trial on the monetary threshold issues for deportation.  Instead, under a 
circumstance-specific approach, the government should be able to submit 
only documentary evidence from the alien’s criminal file that maintains 
traditional minimum guarantees of trustworthiness.  As such, the 
government should be restricted to the following documents from the 
criminal file to satisfy its burden of persuasion for the monetary threshold 
requirement: 
 State or federal statutory definitions of the offense or 
offenses the criminal defendant was convicted of; 
 Official minutes of a court hearing, verbatim transcript, 
abstract of record, or other court-prepared document 
indicating the entry of conviction; 
 Charging documents, accompanied by sufficient evidence 
(admission or otherwise) indicating what the defendant 
actually pled to; 
 Trial court judgment or verdict; 
 Signed plea agreement; 
 Plea colloquy transcript; 
 Documents stipulated to as accurate that form the basis of 
the conviction or sentence; 
 Defendant admissions made as part of his or her plea or 
sentencing process; 
 Specific factual trial court findings, which the criminal 
defendant admitted to or that are based upon a hearing 
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where the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be 
heard and present evidence; 
 Trial court’s sentencing order; 
 Trial court’s restitution order; 
 Jury instructions and jury findings resulting in a guilty 
verdict; and 
 Answers to special damage interrogatories propounded to 
and answered by the jury with an accompanying guilty 
verdict. 
This list is referred to herein as “Reliable and Usable Evidence.” 
Investigative reports (e.g., pre-sentence, probation, and police reports) 
are notoriously untrustworthy and often contain a slanted view of reality 
by utilizing multiple levels of unreliable hearsay.24  If an immigration 
judge considered such reports for determining the monetary threshold 
requirement under M(i) for deportation purposes, the alien respondent 
would be forced into the unfair position of conducting an actual trial 
defense of the statements contained in the report that might have happened 
years earlier.  The government should thus be precluded from using any 
investigative reports found in the alien’s criminal file, unless the alien 
expressly stipulated to the accuracy of such report.  Likewise, the 
government should be precluded from utilizing for deportation purposes 
informal discussions on or off the record by counsel or the court. 
Phase Two: The government must show that the damage threshold 
has been satisfied for the actual criminal conviction, not for some other 
crime or broader conspiracy for which no conviction was obtained.  In 
other words, the loss amount must be specifically tethered to the actual 
offense of conviction and no other conduct. 
Phase Three: The alien must be given a fundamentally fair opportunity 
to dispute the government’s claim that a prior conviction resulted in the 
 
 24.  See, e.g., Carlton F. Gunn, So Many Crimes, So Little Time: The Categorical 
Approach to the Characterization of a Prior Conviction Under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act, 7 FED. SENT’G REP., 66, 67 (1994) (“Presentence reports are notoriously 
unreliable and, even where reliable, are only one summary of the evidence. If such reports are 
considered, moreover, the defendant would presumably have to be allowed to try to 
show that he or she did not really tell the probation officer what the probation officer 
claims or that other reports or evidence upon which the probation officer relied were 
erroneous. Consideration of the presentence reports will raise not only the problems of 
‘mini-trials’ [sic] about events years past but also the problems created by translation of 
those events through the multiple levels of hearsay which go into a presentence report.”). 
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required loss to victims.25  Thus, the alien has “at least one and possibly 
two opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the earlier 
sentencing and the second at the deportation hearing itself.”26 
Phase Four: The government bears the burden of going forward and 
the burden of persuasion (by clear and convincing evidence) that the 
conviction for “fraud or deceit” resulted in a loss to the victim or victims 
of greater than $10,000.27  Accordingly, the immigration court must assess 
findings with an eye to what was actually lost as a result of the convicted 
offense and the applicable standard for the government’s burden of 
persuasion.28  Given the government’s burden of persuasion on  this 
issue, the immigration judge should weigh any uncertainties caused by 
the passage of time in favor of the alien and against the government.29 
III.  PRE-NIJHAWAN: FINDING REMOVABILITY UNDER THE TAYLOR-
SHEPARD CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
All immigration proceedings “must conform to the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement of due process,” even though noncitizens are “not subject to 
the full range of constitutional protections.”30  Accordingly, “an alien 
who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims 
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.”31  
Failure to afford an alien “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence 
against [him]”32 would result in a denial of due process if “the proceeding 
was ‘so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably 
presenting his case.’”33  When the government seeks to remove a lawful 
permanent resident on the grounds of a criminal conviction, the government 
bears the burden of proving both (1) the existence of a criminal conviction 
and (2) that the conviction triggers a ground of deportability.34   
 
 25.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41. 
 26.  Id. at 42. 
 27.  Id. See also INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012). 
 28.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended); 
see also Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012); United Sates v. Reyes-
Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3168 
(U.S. July 11, 2012) (No. 12-5286); Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 
2009) (order). 
 31.  Colmenar v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS), 210 F.3d 967, 971 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
 32.  INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012). 
 33.  Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ibarra-
Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 34.  See INA § 240(c)(3)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)-(B) (2012). 
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Taylor involved an interpretation of a section of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (ACCA), which contains a provision similar to the 
aggravated felony provision in the INA.35  It was Taylor that “established 
the rule for determining when a defendant’s prior conviction counts 
as one of ACCA’s enumerated predicate offenses.”36  The ACCA prescribes 
a mandatory minimum sentence for any conviction involving the possession 
of a firearm by a defendant who has a minimum of three prior convictions 
for a “violent felony or serious drug offense.”37  Analogous to the INA, the 
ACCA defines “violent felony” by listing certain enumerated offenses.38  
Thus, the Supreme Court instructed sentencing courts to employ a two-
step categorical approach when examining whether a prior conviction 
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.39 
First, courts must determine whether the violation of the underlying 
criminal statute includes every element of the generic offense listed in 
the federal statute.  If so, “the mere fact of conviction establishes that the 
putative predicate crime was a violent felony.”40  In other words, the court 
will find the defendant committed a violent felony when the elements of 
the underlying conviction include all of the elements of the generic 
federal definition.41 
Courts should implement what has been referred to as the “modified 
categorical approach” when the underlying criminal statute is divisible 
(i.e., where a statute “comprises multiple, alternative versions of the 
crime,” some of which constitute an element of the generic offense and 
others that do not).42  Under this scenario, a conviction only qualifies as 
a violent felony “‘where a jury was actually required to find all the 
elements’ of the listed offense.”43  As the Supreme Court recently 
explained, the modified categorical approach is really nothing more than 
 
 35.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2011); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990). 
 36.  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). 
 37.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
 38.  See id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 39.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 602. 
 40.  Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. 
at 602). 
 41.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. In sum, “Taylor adopted a ‘formal categorical 
approach’: Sentencing courts may ‘look only to the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements— 
of a defendant’s prior offense, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those convictions.’” 
Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). 
 42.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 43.  Conteh, 461 F.3d at 53 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). 
DEVITT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2016  5:18 PM 
 
12 
“a tool for implementing the categorical approach.”44  It allows for the 
examination of “a limited class of documents to  determine which of a 
statute’s alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s prior 
conviction.”45  Most importantly, when a sentencing court is placed in a 
position to determine actual jury findings, it must limit its inquiry to the 
records of conviction, including the charging document and jury 
instructions.46 
In Shepard v. United States, the Supreme Court extended its categorical 
approach articulated in Taylor to further include prior convictions that 
were the result of a guilty plea rather than a jury trial.47  Again, the Court 
reinforced the limited inquiry permitted under Taylor and determined 
that only where the conviction record makes manifest that the defendant’s 
plea necessarily constituted an admission to every element of a listed 
offense may a sentencing court conclude the defendant pleaded guilty to 
a violent felony.48  Specifically, the Supreme Court in Shephard defined the 
“record[] of the convicting court”49 to include “the statutory definition, 
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 
and any explicitly factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented.”50  In Shepard, the Court: 
[U]nderscored the narrow scope of [the sentencing court’s] review: It was not to 
determine ‘what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the 
factual basis of the prior plea,’ but only to assess whether the plea was to the version 
of the crime in the Massachusetts statute (burglary of a building) corresponding 
to the generic offense.51 
In establishing the outer boundaries of the categorical approach, the 
Court expressly rejected the Government’s argument that the scope of 
the prior offense could be ascertained through facts alleged in a police 
report.52  The Court reasoned that the limited inquiry was necessary to 
effectuate Congress’s true intent of limiting the sentencing enhancement to 
only those convictions considered to be violent felonies.53 
 
 44.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–20 (2005). 
 48.  Id. at 26. 
 49.  Id. at 23. 
 50.  Id. at 16. 
 51.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26). 
 52.  Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21. 
 53.  Id. at 23 & n.4. 
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IV.  PRE-NIJHAWAN: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS’ DIFFERENT 
APPLICATIONS OF THE TAYLOR-SHEPARD CATEGORICAL                         
METHODS WHEN CALCULATING THE INA’S FINANCIAL                                 
FRAUD AND DECEIT $10,000 THRESHOLD PROVISION 
The federal circuits generally viewed the underlying rationale of Taylor 
and Shepard as persuasive, and during the pre-Nijhawan years invoked 
some form of the categorical approach in ascertaining whether an alien’s 
prior conviction triggered immigration penalties under the INA.54  The 
circuits have not, however, reached agreement on the precise, proper 
scope or application of the categorical approach in the immigration 
context; the result has been confusing to say the least.55 
Much of the inconsistencies in these immigration adjudications seem 
to stem from the confusion caused by the wide-ranging discrepancies in 
the state law penal statutes that form the basis of prior criminal 
convictions.56  Some federal circuit courts came to realize that the 
elemental focus of the categorical approach “does not apply neatly to the 
immigration statute.”57  As a result, the federal circuits have employed 
different variations of the categorical approach, even going so far as to 
abandon use of the categorical analysis for certain INA provisions.58 
 
 54.  See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that 
although the BIA and the courts of appeals have imported versions of the categorical 
approach into the context of removal proceedings, there is “no universally accepted 
definition of what constitutes a ‘modified categorical approach’ for immigration-law 
purposes”); see also Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 
125–26 (2d Cir. 2007); Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011). 
 55.  Das, supra note 18, at 1679–80, 1711–19; see also Kawashima v. Mukasey, 
530 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (discussing the 
restrictive view of the modified categorical approach adopted by the court in Navarro-
Lopez v. United States). 
 56.   See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Note, Categorical Approach or Categorical Chaos? 
A Critical Analysis of the Inconsistencies in Determining Whether Felony DWI is a 
Crime of Violence for Purposes of Deportation Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
697 (2003). 
 57.  Das, supra note 18, at 1677; see also id. at 1711–19; Dulal-Whiteway, 501 
F.3d at 128 (“Statutes of conviction rarely correlate precisely with  statutes of 
removability . . . .”). 
 58.  See Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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One provision in particular, the “fraud or deceit” aggravated felony 
provision,59 under which the Government sought to deport Oviedo-Cortez, 
exemplifies the pre-Nijhawan incongruous categorical analyses federal 
courts pursued and the confusion they propagated. 
A.  Ninth Circuit: Strict Categorical Approach 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted M(i)—the fraud and deceit provision—as 
containing two elements: (1) the offense must involve fraud or deceit, 
and (2) the offense must have resulted in a loss to the victim or victims 
of more than $10,000.60  Because the Ninth Circuit viewed the $10,000 
monetary threshold as an element, the court’s application of the Taylor-
Shepard categorical approach led to removal only in the rare situation 
that the noncitizen was actually convicted of both elements.61  Under this 
strict categorical approach, the Ninth Circuit never found that the prior 
conviction for financial fraud itself resulted in removal under M(i) because 
it never encountered an underlying conviction that required proof of both 
elements.62   
As a result, the Ninth Circuit did allow usage of the modified categorical 
approach to determine whether an alien’s underlying conviction qualified as 
an aggravated felony.63  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit then looked to the 
record of conviction to determine whether the jury found, or the criminal 
defendant admitted to, a loss to the victim in excess of $10,000.64  The 
Ninth Circuit limited its inquiry to a “‘narrow, specified set of documents,’” 
including “‘the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a 
signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’”65  But 
 
 59.  INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012). 
 60.  Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114 (citing Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th 
Cir. 2002)); see also Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 61.  See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114. 
 62.  See id. at 1114–15 (recognizing that subscribing to a false statement on a tax 
return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of 
a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), does not require proof of monetary 
loss in excess of $10,000); see also Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 
2007); Scully v. Gonzales, 225 F. App’x 690, 692 (9th Cir. 2007); Haque v. Gonzales, 
223 F. App’x 591, 593 (9th Cir. 2007); Fierarita v. Gonzales, 186 F. App’x 769, 771 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004); Li, 389 F.3d at 897; 
Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 63.  See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114; Kharana, 487 F.3d at 128–84; Ferreira, 
390 F.3d at 1098; Li, 389 F.3d at 897; Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 64.  Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1115 (noting that four prior Ninth Circuit cases have 
looked at conviction records to determine if the jury found or the defendant admitted to 
the required loss (citing Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1284; Ferreira, 390 F.3d at 1098; Li, 289 
F.3d at 897; Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90)). 
 65.  Id. at 1114 n.4 (quoting Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
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the Ninth Circuit refrained from “‘look[ing] beyond the record of conviction 
itself to the particular facts underlying the conviction.’”66 
In 2007, one year before the Supreme Court decided Nijhawan, the 
Ninth Circuit in Kawashima v. Mukasey took an even more restrictive 
view by precluding the immigration court from examining even the record 
of conviction.67  The Ninth Circuit felt compelled to follow its decision in 
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, which foreclosed this further inquiry, since 
M(i)’s monetary loss requirement was an element of the of generic 
offense.68  In Navarro-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit held: 
The modified categorical approach . . . only applies when the particular elements in 
the crime of conviction are broader than the generic crime. When the crime of 
conviction [–e.g., subscribing to a false statement on a tax return–] is missing an 
element of the generic crime altogether, [the court] can never find that “a jury 
was actually required to find all the elements of” the generic crime.69 
The court in Kawashima concluded that since the conviction statutes 
did not require the Government to prove the amount of loss, no further 
inquiry was permissible.70  Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that 
the application of Navarro-Lopez to M(i) essentially rendered the provision 
null,71 since “there are almost no statutes that punish fraud and also specify 
that the fraud must cause a loss of $10,000 or more,”72 it concluded that 
Navarro-Lopez’s rule was “plain and clear” and, therefore, the preceding 
cases were “impliedly overruled.”73  Additionally, the court recognized that 
an alternate approach—namely, interpreting the monetary threshold of 
M(i) as merely a qualifier rather than an additional element—would avoid 
the anomalous consequence that resulted from applying Navarro-Lopez.74  
 
 66.  Id. (quoting Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620). 
 67.  Id. at 1117–18 (concluding that Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales was binding 
precedent, and therefore, the record of the Kawashimas’ convictions could not be consulted). 
 68.  Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 69.  Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1073). 
 70.  Id. at 1115–16. 
 71.  Id. at 1116–17 & n.7 (collecting examples of fraud violations). 
 72.  Id. at 1120 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring). 
 73.  Id. at 1116 (majority opinion). 
 74.  Id. (recognizing the approach of the Third and the Fifth circuits, as applied in 
Singh v. Ashcroft and Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey) (citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 
144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 
2008)).  Judge O’Scannlain’s concurring opinion also recognized that reformulation of 
the modified categorical approach in Navarro-Lopez had no support from any 
other courts of appeal and was decided without addressing the dissenting views of the 
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But nevertheless, the court declined to adopt this alternative approach 
because the Navarro-Lopez rule now “control[s the] modified categorical 
analysis of aggravated felonies defined in Subsection M(i).”75 
B.  Second and Eleventh Circuits: Modified Categorical Approach 
Allowing Examination of the Conviction Record 
The Second Circuit has consistently found the Taylor-Shepard approach 
instructive for establishing removability76 under the INA.  In Dulal-
Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., the court noted four similarities 
between the INA and ACCA77 as particularly persuasive in its decision to 
extend Taylor’s rationale in the immigration context.78 
In applying the categorical analysis to M(i), the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that “few statutes criminalizing fraud enumerate distinct 
violations corresponding to the $10,000 loss amount required by the 
[INA].”79  Under the Second Circuit’s version of the Taylor analysis, 
 
other circuits or acknowledging the precedents it overturned. Id. at 1124 (O’Scannlain, 
J., concurring). 
 75.  Id. at 1118 (majority opinion).  The court in Kawashima reasoned that the lone 
authority relied upon by the en banc court in Navarro-Lopez, Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 
892, 899–901 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., concurring), was a quote from Judge Kozinski 
stating, “he would not have examined the record at all because Subsection M(i)’s amount 
of loss requirement ‘wasn’t an element’ of the statutes under which the petitioner had 
been convicted.” Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1117 (citing Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 
1073). 
 76.  Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 125 (citing 
Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the categorical 
approach to determine whether an alien was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 
 77.  The sentencing statute at issue in Taylor was the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). 
 78.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125–26 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 
117).  First, the court noted that the INA’s the aggravated felony provision, like the 
sentencing enhancement provision of the ACCA, applies only to aliens “convicted” of an 
aggravated felony, not aliens who have merely “committed” an aggravated felony.  Id. at 
125 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117).  Second, the court reasoned that “nothing 
in the legislative history suggested a factfinding role for the BIA in ascertaining whether 
an alien had committed an aggravated felony, just as, in Taylor, nothing suggested such a 
role for the sentencing court in evaluating the factual basis of a prior  burglary 
conviction.”  Id. at 125–26 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117).  Third, the court 
“found that the practical evidentiary difficulties and potential unfairness associated with 
looking behind the offense of conviction were ‘no less daunting’ in the immigration than 
in the sentencing context.” Id. at 126 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117).  Lastly, 
the court recognized that the limited scope of the modified categorical approach 
facilitated the immigration judge’s analysis by focusing on the “indictment or jury 
instructions to determine the basis of an alien’s conviction.” Id. (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 
250 F.3d at 117–18). 
 79.  Id. at 126–28. 
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the court must first determine whether the underlying statute is divisible.80  
Only if the statute is divisible can the court consult  the record of 
conviction to determine whether the victim suffered the requisite amount 
of loss.81  According to the Second Circuit, a statute is divisible “where 
the removable and non-removable offenses they describe are listed in 
different subsections or comprise discrete elements of a disjunctive list 
of proscribed conduct.”82 
The conviction at issue in Dulal-Whiteway, however, did not involve 
discrete elements or different subsections.83  Rather, the criminal statute 
prohibited obtaining anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more, by 
the use of unauthorized access devices with the intent to defraud.84  The 
Government argued that the court could consult the conviction records 
because the statute was divisible since it “proscribe[d] some conduct that 
is not removable—fraud causing a loss between $1000 and $10,000—and 
some conduct that is removable—fraud causing a loss greater than 
$10,000.”85  The Second Circuit agreed and looked to the record of 
conviction to determine whether the amount of loss exceeded $10,000.86 
Similar to the pre-Navarro-Lopez decisions of the Ninth Circuit, the 
Second Circuit only considered sources specifically contained in the record 
 
 80.  Id. at 126.  The Supreme Court recently affirmed the Second Circuit’s approach as 
the proper analysis for determining aggravated felony convictions in Moncrieffe v. Holder 
and Descamps v. United States. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013); 
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281–83 (2013). 
 81.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 126. 
 82.  Id. at 126–27 (giving examples of cases involving divisible statutes); see, e.g., 
Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2001) (statute divisible); Dickson v. 
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (statute divisible); Canada v. Gonzales, 448 
F.3d 560, 567–68 (2d Cir. 2006) (statute not divisible). 
 83.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 123 (noting that the alien was convicted of 
“knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access 
devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value 
aggregating $1,000 or more during that period,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 126. 
 86.  Id. at 128.  See also supra text accompanying notes 62–74.  The Ninth Circuit 
did not use the terminology “divisible,” however, the issue regarding the record of conviction 
and whether it may be examined was essentially the same.  In Dulal-Whiteway, the 
Second Circuit presumed it could consult the record of conviction, Dulal-Whiteway, 501 
F.3d at 128, and the Ninth Circuit determined that Navarro-Lopez’s interpretation of 
Taylor precluded the court from examining the record of conviction. See supra note 68 
and accompanying text. 
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of conviction.87  The Second Circuit looked to section 240(c)(3)(B) of the 
INA, which lists the materials that may supply “proof of a criminal 
conviction,”88 and held that the “permissible materials include a charging 
document (such as an indictment), a signed plea agreement, a verdict or 
judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence; a plea colloquy transcript, 
and jury instructions.”89 
The Second Circuit expressly rejected the use of a presentence 
investigation report [“PSR”] to establish the amount of loss.90  The court 
expressed doubt regarding the reliability of PSRs since the primary 
purpose of such reports is to aid the sentencing court and therefore often 
contain background information and details about a crime drawn from 
probation officers’ own interviews.91  Moreover, PSRs routinely describe 
“‘conduct that demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the 
alien was never convicted of it.’”92  The court concluded that the 
 
 87.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 128–29; see also supra text accompanying notes 
65–66. 
 88.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 128–29.  Section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA provides: 
(B)  Proof of Convictions. In any proceeding under this Act, any of the following 
documents or records (or a certified copy of such an official document or 
record) shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction: 
(i)  An official record of judgment and conviction. 
(ii)  An official record of plea, verdict, and sentence. 
(iii) A docket entry from court records that indicates the existence of the 
conviction. 
(iv)  Official minutes of a court proceeding or a transcript of a court 
hearing in which the court takes notice of the existence of the 
conviction. 
(v)  An abstract of a record of conviction prepared by the court in 
which the conviction was entered, or by a State official associated 
with the State’s repository of criminal justice records, that indicates 
the charge or section of law violated, the disposition of the case, 
the existence and date of conviction, and the sentence. 
(vi)  Any document or record prepared by, or under the direction of, the 
court in which the conviction was entered that indicates the existence 
of a conviction. 
(vii)  Any document or record attesting to the conviction that is maintained 
by an official of a State or Federal penal institution, which is the 
basis for that institution’s authority to assume custody of the 
individual named in the record. 
INA § 240(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2012). 
 89.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 129; see also Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 
53 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the appropriate evidence admissible to prove a conviction). 
 90.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d. at 129. 
 91.  Id. (referencing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54). 
 92.  Id. (quoting Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54) (emphasis in original). 
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“unproven (and sometimes inadmissible) facts” included in PSRs are “an 
inappropriate basis on which to rest a removal decision.”93 
In addition, the Second Circuit also disagreed with the First Circuit and 
followed a stricter interpretation of Shepard expressly rejecting the use of 
a restitution order to prove loss.94  Although the court acknowledged that 
Taylor and Shepard were criminal sentencing cases, it nonetheless found 
the more restrictive inquiry convincing95 and therefore determined that 
because “the amount of restitution is not constrained by facts on which 
the plea ‘necessarily’ rested,” it could not be used to determine loss.96  Thus, 
in rejecting both PSRs and restitution orders, the Second Circuit held: 
For convictions following a trial, the BIA may rely only upon facts actually and 
necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge in order to 
establish the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document or 
jury instructions. For convictions following a plea, the BIA may rely only upon 
facts to which a defendant actually and necessarily pleaded in order to establish 
the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document, written plea 
agreement, or plea colloquy transcript.97 
The court concluded that its holding was compelled by three principles: (1) 
the plain meaning of the INA refers only to convicted conduct;98 (2) the 
 
 93.  Id. (referencing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54) (giving a thorough analysis of why 
PSRs are unreliable).  Careful criminal defense attorneys representing noncitizen clients 
routinely object to the PSR findings. 
 94.  Id. at 131–32 (rejecting the First Circuit’s approach, as demonstrated in Conteh v. 
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006), which found the INA dissimilar from the Taylor 
and Shepard decisions, and held that a restitution order was appropriate evidence to 
establish the requisite amount of loss). 
 95.  Id. at 130 (noting that “Taylor and Shepard were sentencing decisions, and 
differences between criminal punishment and the civil removal power might justify a 
circumscribed application of those decisions in the latter context”).  This was, however, 
the First Circuit’s rationale in Conteh, 461 F.3d at 55 (“declin[ing] the invitation to transplant 
the categorical approach root and branch—without any modification whatever—into  the 
civil removal context”). 
 96.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 130 (referring to Shepard’s instruction that when 
determining whether a prior conviction in a pleaded case was based on a particular 
offense, the court’s inquiry should be limited to facts on which “the plea had ‘necessarily’ 
rested,” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 602 (1990))). 
 97.  Id. at 131. 
 98.  Id. at 131–32 (citing Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
The Second Circuit also explained that because the alien must be “convicted” of an 
aggravated felony, the facts used to establish removability must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 132.  Furthermore, the court noted the standard in civil removable 
proceedings—clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence—would not be properly 
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BIA and appellate courts are institutionally less competent “to re-adjudicate 
the basis of prior criminal convictions;”99 and (3) general conceptions of 
fairness—for example, “‘if a guilty plea to a lesser, [non-removable] offense 
was the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to [order removal] 
as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to [a removable offense].’”100 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted an approach similar to the one announced 
by the Second Circuit.101  In Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney General, the 
Eleventh Circuit, following its interpretation of Taylor-Shepard, first 
conducted a categorical analysis to determine whether Obasohan was an 
aggravated felon under M(i).102  Then, because Obasohan pled guilty to, 
and was convicted of, one count of conspiracy to produce, use, and traffic 
one or more counterfeit access devices,103 the court applied the Shepard 
modified categorical approach.104  In its review of the immigration court’s 
decision, the Eleventh Circuit chided the immigration judge for 
“confus[ing] the issues of conviction and restitution.”105  According to the 
Eleventh Circuit, it was plain error for the immigration judge “to rely solely 
on the loss amounts contained in the restitution order as ‘clear, convincing 
and unequivocal’ evidence.”106  The court explained in depth that, while 
a sentencing court may consider “a broad range of relevant conduct, the 
plain language of the INA requires that an alien have been convicted of 
an aggravated felony to be removable.”107 
The Eleventh Circuit found the restitution order insufficient as a matter 
of law because the standard of proof required for the restitution order is 
only a preponderance of the evidence, but loss must be established by 
“clear, convincing and unequivocal” evidence in order to support a 
 
satisfied if the immigration judge [“IJ”] were to rely on sentencing facts, which only 
require the lower preponderance of the evidence standard.  Id.  See also 8 U.S.C.   
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 99.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132 (expressing concern about reviewing courts 
acting as fact-finders and weighing evidence in a manner only appropriate for a criminal 
jury); see also Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 119.  Furthermore, the court acknowledged 
that “[i]t was this very concern about collateral trials, and the oppressive administrative 
burden they impose, that led the BIA to adopt (and [the second circuit] to endorse) the 
categorical approach to removability in the first instance.” Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 
132 (citing Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117–18; Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 264 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Matter of Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 335 (B.I.A. 1996)). 
 100.  Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132–33 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02). 
 101.  See, e.g., Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 102.  Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 788–91. See also supra text accompanying notes 37–47. 
 103.  18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1), (b)(2) (2006). 
 104.  Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789. 
 105.  Id. at 790. 
 106.  Id. at 789. 
 107.  Id. at 790 (emphasis in original). 
DEVITT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2016  5:18 PM 
[VOL. 15:  1, 2013]  Nijhawan v. Holder 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 21 
finding of removal.108  Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, appellate 
courts must confine their review to the record of conviction in order to 
determine the facts upon which the alien’s prior conviction actually and 
necessarily rested.109 
C.  First Circuit: Modified Categorical Approach Allowing Examination 
of Restitution Orders in Addition to the Record of Conviction 
The First Circuit consistently employed the modified categorical 
approach to charges of deportability under M(i), but departed from its 
sister circuits in Conteh v. Gonzales,110 in which it held that restitution 
orders were part of the record of conviction.111  Similar to the Second 
Circuit, the First Circuit consulted section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA to 
determine what evidence the immigration judge and the BIA may consider 
in assessing whether an underlying conviction is an aggravated felony.112  
The court also considered an implementing regulation containing a 
catch-all provision stating, “[a]ny other evidence that reasonably indicates 
the existence of a criminal conviction may be admissible as evidence 
thereof.”113 
Under the guidance of these statutes, the First Circuit reviewed the 
evidence used by the immigration judge and the BIA to order the alien’s 
removal.114  The court concluded that the statutes permit the BIA to 
reference the indictment, the judgment, and the restitution order from the 
antecedent criminal case because these “documents comprise ‘conclusive 
[judicial] records made or used in adjudicating guilt.’”115  Elaborating on 
the reliability of restitution orders, the court emphasized that, although 
 
 108.  Id. at 791. 
 109.  See id. at 789–90 (finding the INA analogous to the inquiry made by the 
sentencing in court in Taylor and Shepard, and holding that the IJ erred by “not hav[ing] 
relied on the statutory elements of the offense, the indictment, the plea or the plea 
colloquy to conclude that Obasohan was convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in 
the INA”); see also Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 131. See also supra text accompanying 
notes 63–65. 
 110.  Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 111.  Id. at 59. 
 112.  Id. at 57. 
 113.  Id. at 57 (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) (2012)). 
 114.  The First Circuit reviewed the indictment, the judgment, the restitution order, 
the PSR, and the alien’s testimony at the removal hearing. Id. at 52, 58–59. 
 115.  Id. at 59 (alteration in original) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
21 (2005)). 
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restitution orders alone are not dispositive of actual loss, “‘[t]he amount 
of restitution ordered . . . may be helpful to a court’s inquiry into the amount 
of loss to the victim’” where the district court makes an explicit finding of 
loss as part of its final judgment and the restitution order corroborates 
the district court’s finding.116 
Conversely, the First Circuit rejected the BIA’s reliance on the alien’s 
testimony and the PSR.117  The court reasoned that the catchall provision in 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) authorizes the admission of evidence for the sole 
purpose of proving “‘the existence of a criminal conviction,’” not the 
authorization of evidence for the purpose of proving the facts underlying 
the offense of conviction.118  Because an alien’s testimony contains 
“after-the-fact statements made in a separate and subsequent proceeding” 
and the PSR contains narrative statements unrelated to the alien’s 
conviction, these items are only useful to prove the existence of a 
conviction, but not removability.119 
D.  Fifth and Third Circuits: Abandoning the Categorical Approach in 
Favor of Examining the Underlying Facts 
In Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, the Fifth Circuit rejected the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches to determining loss 
under M(i).120  The court stated, “[w]hen the amount of loss . . . is not an 
element of an offense, the focus should not be limited to the conviction 
itself.”121  Under this reasoning, the amount of loss is a “factual matter”122 
that can be proven by looking beyond the record of conviction to documents 
produced for sentencing purposes because “[t]he amount of loss is relevant 
in a criminal prosecution primarily, if not exclusively, to sentencing.”123  
Accordingly, “[w]hen a tribunal subsequently examines . . . the amount of 
 
 116.  Id. at 61–62 (citing Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).  
The court distinguished the restitution order in Conteh from those “artificially manipulated for 
the sole purpose of influencing an alien’s immigration status” noting, “that award is not 
controlling with respect to the amount of loss.”  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 58–59. 
 118.  Id. at 58 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) (2012)). 
 119.  Id. at 58–59. 
 120.  Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 
James v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2006) (representing the circuit’s first 
departure from the categorical/ modified categorical approach under M(i)). 
 121.  Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 177. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  Also note the court’s distinction between this and the modified categorical 
approach– “The modified categorical approach accordingly restricts the documents that 
may be consulted to determine whether a conviction was for a generic offense, and the 
focus is, properly, on the conviction.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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loss resulting from an offense, the reason for applying the modified 
categorical approach does not fully obtain.”124 
While relying on only a PSR, the Fifth Circuit held that the alien’s 
guilty plea to a single count of filing a false tax return in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7206(1) was a removable offense pursuant to M(i).125  Rather 
than requiring the Government produce the alien’s written plea 
agreement,126 the Fifth Circuit accepted a chart in the PSR purporting to 
show the amount of tax the alien owed for years 1996-2000 (including 
$75,982 in 1999) as clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances 
surrounding the alien’s conviction resulted in over $10,000 in loss to the 
Government.127  To justify this holding, the court relied on the alien’s 
failure to object to the facts in the PSR during the sentencing phase of 
his conviction, the alien’s admission during sentencing that the amounts 
contained in the PSR were correct, and the district court’s adoption of the 
PSR as a factual finding.128  Surprisingly, the majority opinion never 
mentions that the alien, in his removal proceedings, specifically denied 
that his conviction resulted in a loss exceeding $10,000, or that he 
consistently objected to the inclusion of the PSR.129  No other circuit 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s use of a PSR alone as sufficient to establish 
loss under M(i) by clear and convincing evidence as required by INA 
section 240(c)(3)(A). 
The Third Circuit also found that the language of M(i)’s loss 
requirement permitted the immigration court to look at sentencing 
documents to determine whether the alien’s underlying conviction caused a 
 
 124.  Id. at 177–78. 
 125.  Id. at 179–80. 
 126.  Id. at 181 (Dennis, J., dissenting).  The dissent calls attention to the “potential 
of unfair practices, inequality of justice, and deportations based on constructive paper 
trails,” id. at 180, when it points out, 
[t]he DHS does not explain why it failed to introduce this crucial document into 
evidence. If the written Plea Agreement discloses clearly that Arguelles underpaid 
his 1999 taxes by more than $10,000, the DHS’s failure to file it has caused this 
court to expend time and effort unnecessarily on the appeal, the oral argument and 
the opinion writing on this issue. If the Plea Agreement does not contain clear 
evidence to this effect, then a serious question is raised as to whether the DHS has 
fairly dealt with Arguelles and honorably with this court. 
Id. at 181 n.2. 
 127.  Id. at 179 (majority opinion), 181–82 n.4 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 128.  Id. at 179 (majority opinion); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(C). 
 129.  These concerns are raised in the dissent.  Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 181–82 
(Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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loss of over $10,000 to the victim.130  The Third Circuit therefore discarded 
the categorical approach in favor of a circumstance-specific method.   
Manoj Nijhawan was born in India and immigrated to the United States 
as a legal permanent resident in 1985.131  In 2002, Nijhawan was one of 15 
defendants arrested and indicted for involvement in a massive “fraudulent 
scheme to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars in loans from numerous 
major banks.”132  Of the fifteen defendants originally named in the 
indictment, five (including Nijhawan) went to trial.133  On May 12, 2004, 
the jury convicted Nijhawan of Counts One and Thirty of the indictment.134  
Count One, the overall conspiracy count, contained a general loss allegation 
as to the entire fraud scheme and involved conspiracy to commit bank 
fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.135  Count 
Thirty alleged conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).136  However, the jury was not asked to, nor did it, 
determine the amount of loss attributable to any individual defendant, 
including Nijhawan.137 
Nijhawan entered into a stipulation—for sentencing purposes only—in 
which he agreed that the total loss from his convicted offenses exceeded 
$100 million, and therefore a twenty-six level enhancement was 
warranted.138  When entering the judgment of conviction, the trial judge 
filled in the space for “loss” with the amount “$683,632,800.23.”139  
However, the trial judge held, and the Government expressly agreed, that 
this amount was not a determination that Nijhawan had, in fact, 
caused a loss in excess of $10,000.140  Nijhawan was sentenced to forty-
 
 130.  Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006); Nijhawan v. U.S. Attorney 
Gen., 523 F.3d 387, 394–95 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 131.  Brief for Petitioner at 6, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (No. 08-495). 
 132.  Id. at 7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 20, at 4. 
 133.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 7. 
 134.  Id. at 7–8. 
 135.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 10.  From the trial transcript: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . That’s the entire scheme issue, joint and several 
liability, that any defendant could be held in effect responsible for all other 
defendants. That’s not a finding of over $10,000 specific to this defendant. 
THE COURT: I think that’s right. Do you agree with that [Assistant United 
States Attorney (“AUSA”)]? 
[AUSA]: Yeah, I think it’s right Your Honor, just the loss. 
Id. at 10–11 (emphasis and alteration in original). 
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one months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $683,632,800.23 in 
restitution.141 
While Nijhawan was serving his sentence, DHS initiated removal 
proceedings against him for committing an aggravated felony under 
sections 101(a)(43)(D) and (M)(i) of the INA.142  The immigration judge 
sustained both charges and entered an order of removal against Nijhawan 
on February 22, 2006.143  On appeal, the BIA rested its decision upon the 
M(i) charge.144  In the BIA’s written decision,145 the single-member panel 
looked beyond Nijhawan’s record of conviction to determine the amount 
of loss and “held that the stipulation, judgment of conviction, and restitution 
order were ‘sufficient to establish that [Nijhawan’s] conviction renders him 
removable.’”146 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Nijhawan argued that the BIA erred by 
establishing loss based on evidence outside of the record of conviction, 
particularly the sentencing documents.147  Nijhawan argued that the BIA 
was bound by the modified categorical approach and could only consult 
the limited set of documents from the criminal trial to satisfy the loss 
requirement of M(i).148  Specifically, Nijhawan contended that, since the 
jury did not, and was not instructed to, make a finding of loss under the 
statute of conviction, his conviction was not an aggravated felony within 
the meaning of the INA.149  Conversely, the Government argued that the 
language of M(i) allows the immigration judge and the BIA to consider 
 
 141.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389. 
 142.  Id.  DHS later amended the charge under M(i) to add a charge under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U) (2012) (attempt to commit an aggravated felony). Brief for the 
Respondent, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
 143.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  The BIA’s decision was a written, non-precedent decision issued by a single 
board member on August 8, 2006.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 12. 
 146.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 390 (citing the BIA’s decision from the A.R.); Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 131, at 12. 
 147.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 391. 
 148.  Id. at 391–93, 396–97, 400 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).  The dissent referenced 
decisions by the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in which the courts limited their 
inquiry to the record of conviction under the modified categorical approach.  Nijhawan, 
523 F.3d at 400. See Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 
128 (2d Cir. 2007); Li v. Ascroft, 389 F.3d 892, 895–98 (9th Cir. 2004); Obasohan v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 788–89 (11th Cir. 2007); see also supra Parts IV.A, 
IV.B. 
 149.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389. 
DEVITT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2016  5:18 PM 
 
26 
any evidence from the criminal record to determine “what loss was, in fact, 
occasioned by or attributable to the offense of conviction.”150 
Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that the language of M(i) “does 
not require a jury to have determined that there was a loss in excess of 
$10,000 [because] [t]o read the ‘in which’ language as requiring that what 
follows must have been proven as an element of the crime would bring 
about an absurd result.”151  The court expressly departed from the 
restrictions of the categorical and modified categorical approaches of 
Taylor and Shepard, stating, “[t]he ‘in which’ qualifying language renders 
the analysis under [M(i)] different from the approach in Taylor and 
Shepard.” 152  “Accordingly, our Court’s precedent directs us to ‘examine 
the facts at issue,’ because the amount of loss is a ‘qualifier,’ not an 
element.”153 
Under this interpretation of M(i), the BIA was permitted to rely on 
evidence outside of the record of conviction to satisfy the loss  
requirement.154  Therefore, the only issue left for the court to decide was 
“whether the ‘tether’ of a loss in excess of $10,000 to Count 1 . . . 
[was] sufficiently strong” to provide clear and convincing evidence that 
the requisite amount of loss was tied to Nijhawan’s offense of conviction.155 
 
 150.  Id. at 391. 
 151.  Id.  (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). 
 152.  Id. at 392. 
 153.  Id. at 393–94. The court references the following precedent: 
(1)  Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2003), where Defendant was 
not required to plead guilty to a loss amount for removal under  INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 394 (citing Munroe, 353 F.3d 
225).  Instead, the court looked to the indictment “which contained an 
averment as to loss in excess of $10,000, rather than an amended restitution 
order, which reduced defendant’s restitution to $9,999.”  Id. (citing 
Munroe, 353 F.3d at 227).  However, the court stated that under different 
circumstances, “‘the amount of restitution ordered as a result of a 
conviction may be helpful to a court’s inquiry into the amount of loss to 
the victim if the plea agreement or indictment is unclear as to the loss 
suffered.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Munroe, 353 F.3d at 227); and 
(2)  Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), which stands 
for the proposition that “one who has admitted to a loss of less than 
$10,000 as part of a guilty plea cannot later be said to have been 
convicted of an offense involving fraud in which the loss to the victim 
exceeds $10,000.”  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 394.  “Alaka requires only that 
we ‘focus narrowly on the loss amounts that are particularly tethered to 
the convicted counts.’” Id. at 394–95 (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 107). 
 154.  Id. at 395–96. 
 155.  Id. at 395. 
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E.  Lower Court’s Development of the Tethering Requirement 
In Nijhawan, the Third Circuit declined to address the “nature of the 
nexus required” (i.e. the “tether”) between the conduct of which the alien 
was actually convicted and the amount of loss required by the statute.156  
Most courts, however, had already explicitly required that “what constitutes 
an ‘aggravated felony’ for purposes of the INA must be tethered to 
convicted conduct.”157  In other words, only conduct of which the noncitizen 
was actually convicted may count towards fulfilling the $10,000 loss 
requirement of M(i). 
The BIA has also recognized that “additional conduct that was not 
‘particularly tethered to convicted counts’ cannot satisfy the [Government’s] 
burden . . . under . . . the Act . . . [because] a restitution order based upon 
additional evidence which is only proven by a “preponderance of evidence” 
during the criminal proceedings cannot satisfy the DHS’s burden of proving 
an aggravated felony by “clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.”158  
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Knutsen v. Gonzales159 reasoned that 
“‘consistent with the statute . . . the court should focus narrowly on the loss 
amounts that are particularly tethered to convicted counts alone.’”160  
Because the loss figure contained in the stipulation was based on both 
convicted and unconvicted conduct, the court held that it was error for 
the immigration judge and the BIA to rely on the alien’s stipulation as 
proof of the actual loss.161 
The tethering requirement is in line with “the plain and unambiguous 
language of the [INA], which predicates removal on a convicted offense,”162 
and it functions as a limit on what evidence the government may use 
(and subsequently, what the judge may review) in removal proceedings.  
Thus, when determining whether the noncitizen’s conviction actually 
caused greater than $10,000 in loss, the immigration judge may only 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 2007); see also 
Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 158.  In re Osarias Monday Omoregbee, No. A29891115, 2007 WL 2299662, at *2 
(B.I.A. July 17, 2007) (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90). 
 159.  Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 160.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396 (alteration and emphasis in original) (citing 
Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739–40). 
 161.  Id. (citing Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739). 
 162.  Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 736 (emphasis in original). 
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consult documents in the criminal record that are explicitly tethered to 
the noncitizen’s conviction. 
In spite of strong support for strict adherence to the tethering 
requirement under the modified categorical approach, the Third Circuit 
reversed its course and joined the First and Fifth Circuits in allowing 
removal to be based on documents that were not explicitly tethered to 
Nijhawan’s criminal conduct.163  Notwithstanding its past claims to the 
contrary,164 the Third Circuit claimed that case law “requires an ‘inquiry 
into the underlying facts of the case’ to ascertain whether the ‘in which’ 
qualifying loss provision is satisfied.”165  In support of its broader inquiry, 
the court cited the First Circuit’s decision in Conteh and the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Obasohan. 
The Third Circuit relied on the reasoning in Conteh, wherein the 
First Circuit recommended a focus on the loss occasioned by the conviction, 
rather than loss as an element to be found by the jury or explicitly 
incorporated in the plea agreement.166  However, the court in Conteh 
noted that the distinction between “‘conviction for and commission of an 
aggravated felony is an important one; because the BIA may not adjudicate 
guilt or mete out criminal punishment, it must base removal orders on 
convictions, not on conduct alone.’”167 
The Third Circuit also found that its own circuit precedent provided that 
“the loss amount need not be found specifically by the jury or set forth in 
the plea agreement or colloquy.”168  In Alaka v. Attorney General, the Third 
Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Knutsen to hold that 
courts must “‘focus narrowly on the loss amounts that are particularly 
tethered to the convicted counts.’”169  In Alaka, the total loss alleged in the 
noncitizen’s indictment exceeded $10,000, but this amount was connected 
with the overall scheme the noncitizen was involved in, not the single 
count to which the alien pleaded guilty.170  Because the noncitizen’s plea 
agreement only referenced a loss to the victim of $4,716.68 resulting from 
the alien’s actual conviction,171 and all other counts against the alien were 
 
 163.  See supra Parts IV.C–IV.E 
 164.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396–999. The Third Circuit repeatedly claims that it 
has not abandoned the Taylor-Shepard approach or the tethering requirement. Id. 
 165.  Id. at 396. 
 166.  Id. at 395 (citing Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
 167.  Id. at 395 (emphasis in original) (quoting Conteh, 461 F.3d at 56). 
 168.  Id. at 397. 
 169.  Id. at 394–95 (citing Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
 170.  Id. at 394 (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92). 
 171.  Id. (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92). 
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dismissed as a result of the plea agreement,172 the Third Circuit held that 
“[w]here there is a plea agreement that sets forth the loss it is to that 
agreement [the court] must look to determine the loss.”173 
Lastly, the Third Circuit cited the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Obasohan174 in support of its review of the sentencing documents as long 
as the amount of loss is tethered to the underlying conviction.175  As 
previously mentioned, the noncitizen in Obasohan had been ordered to 
pay restitution due to fraudulent charges on other credit cards that were 
not the subject of the indictment or the plea agreement.176  The Eleventh 
Circuit held it was an error to rely on the noncitizen’s PSR and restitution 
order as clear and convincing evidence of loss because the PSR and 
restitution order “[were] based entirely on other unconvicted conduct . . . 
‘that was alleged only in the [PSR].’”177 
Although Nijhawan urged the court to depart from its case law and 
follow the approach of the Second and Ninth Circuits,178 the Third Circuit 
held that since “the loss requirement invites further inquiry into the facts 
underlying the conviction, . . . that inquiry is satisfied if the amount of loss 
is sufficiently tethered to the fraud conviction.”179  Therefore, the court 
concluded that “taken together, the indictment, judgment of conviction, and 
stipulation provide clear and convincing evidence that the requisite loss 
was tied to Nijhawan’s offense of conviction.”180 
V.  NIJHAWAN : THE SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF THE TAYLOR-
SHEPARD CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR THE INA’S                                      
FINANCIAL FRAUD AND DECEIT $10,000                                                                
LOSS THRESHOLD PROVISION 
The Supreme Court recognized the disagreement among the circuits 
and granted certiorari, framing the issue as,  
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 175.  Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396 (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d 785). 
 176.  Id. (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90). 
 177.  Id. (quoting Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90). 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Id. at 397. 
 180.  Id. at 395. 
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whether the italicized statutory words ‘. . . in which the loss to the . . . 
victims exceeds $10,000’ should be interpreted . . . as referring to a generic 
crime, or . . . as referring to the specific way in which an offender committed 
the crime on a specific occasion.181   
The Court explained that if the statutory words referred to a generic 
crime, an appropriate monetary threshold must be included in the statute 
defining the offense.182  If, however, the words of the statute referred to 
the specific circumstances of the offender’s crime, the loss may be 
determined by looking to the facts and circumstances underlying an 
offender’s conviction.183 
The Supreme Court held that the “fraud and deceit” provision calls  
for a “circumstance-specific,” not a “categorical,” interpretation, rejecting 
Nijhawan’s argument in favor of the categorical approach.184  The Court 
reasoned that despite some similarities between the ACCA and the INA, 
the ‘fraud and deceit’ provision of the INA was sufficiently different from 
the ACCA’s provisions to necessitate departure from the categorical 
approach.185 
The Court acknowledged that the aggravated felony statute of the INA 
“resembles the ACCA in certain respects;”186 both contain a list of 
generic offenses and require the court to determine whether the defendant’s 
conviction meets the generic definition.187  But the Court went on to note 
that the crucial difference between the ACCA and the INA is that some 
of the offenses in the INA “us[e] language that almost certainly does not 
refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances.”188  To illustrate 
this point, the Court referred to aggravated felony provisions (P) and (N) 
 
 181.  Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 36. The Court referred to the Third Circuit’s approach as “circumstance-
specific” because it allowed a court to examine the underlying circumstances of the 
crime, and it referred to the Ninth and Second circuit’s approach as “categorical,” as 
adopted from Taylor.  Id. at 34. 
 185.  Id. at 36. 
 186.  Id. at 37 (comparing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), the provision of the INA that 
defines aggravated felony, to the ACCA). 
 187.  Id. (recognizing that “aggravated felony” is defined by certain generic crimes 
such as, “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)). 
 188.  Id.  At oral argument, Justice Souter also noted: 
The fact is also that this provision, the $10,000 figure, was placed into the 
statute at a time when Congress was trying to expand the category of deportable, 
removable offenses, and it would be passing strange in that context to define 
the offense by reference to a $10,000 figure as an element of the offense which 
would cut it down, which would cut the compass of the statute down to three 
offenses.  
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 13. 
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as examples.  According to the Court, these provisions contain language 
that “cannot possibly refer to a generic crime . . . because there is no such 
generic crime.”189  For instance, subsection (P) refers to convictions for 
making false passports, but also exempts “a first offense for which the 
alien . . . committed the offense for the purpose of assisting . . . the alien’s 
spouse.”190  The Court reasoned that “if the provision is to have any 
meaning at all, the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in 
which an offender committed the crime on a particular occasion.”191 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan, if a noncitizen is 
charged as deportable under one of the provisions of the INA that contains 
a factual circumstance clause, such as the M(i) requirement of greater 
than $10,000 in loss, immigration courts should apply the categorical (or 
modified categorical) approach to the elemental part of the offense and 
the circumstance-specific approach to the factual part.  Thus, the Court 
sanctioned use of certain documents outside of the record of conviction to 
ascertain whether the requisite factual circumstances accompanied 
the noncitizen’s criminal conviction.192 
VI.  POST-NIJHAWAN : WHAT CONSTITUTES CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE UNDER A CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS? 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Nijhawan expanded the legal analysis 
for certain aggravated felony provisions to include an examination of 
the factual circumstances surrounding the alien’s conviction.  But the 
Court failed to clearly define the scope of this evidentiary inquiry. 
In one respect, the Court’s lack of guidance is understandable given 
the facts of the Nijhawan case.  In Nijhawan, there was no question that 
the alien’s criminal conduct caused over $10,000 in loss.  In fact, the alien 
stipulated for the sentencing hearing that the loss exceeded $100 million.193  
As the Supreme Court concluded, the immigration judge’s reliance on 
Nijhawan’s stipulation and the corroborating restitution order, in the 
absence of any conflicting evidence, was clear and convincing evidence that 
 
 189.  Id. at 37. 
 190.  Id.  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (2012). 
 191.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38. 
 192.  Id. at 40. 
 193.  Id. at 32. 
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“the conviction involved losses considerably greater than $10,000.”194  But 
that was an easy case. 
The Nijhawan Court’s adoption of the circumstance-specific analysis 
has led the government to tout an array of sentencing and other documents, 
previously insufficient on their own, as adequate evidence to meet its 
clear and convincing burden.  Whatever qualms one may have with the 
Supreme Court’s departure from the categorical approach in Nijhawan, it 
is clear that the bigger concern is the effect of its holding on evidentiary 
standards in post-Nijhawan immigration courts.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many courts, like the immigration court in Oviedo-Cortez v. 
Holder, have grossly misconstrued the clear and convincing standard under 
the circumstance-specific inquiry. 
A.  The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Requires Reliable 
Evidence Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent                                      
and the INA 
The government “must meet a ‘clear and convincing’ [evidence] 
standard”195 before it can remove a lawful permanent resident for 
committing an aggravated felony under M(i).  This standard is less 
burdensome than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more burdensome 
than a preponderance of evidence standard.196  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines clear and convincing evidence as “[e]vidence indicating that the 
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”197  Typically, 
the ultimate burden of proof in civil proceedings is proof by a  
preponderance of evidence—the party carrying this burden will prevail if 
there is enough evidence to make the desired outcome more likely than 
not.198  However, the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Woodby v. 
INS, setting the burden of proof in removal proceedings for lawful 
permanent residents, held that proof by a preponderance of evidence 
was not sufficient given the severe consequence of deportation.199  The 
Woodby Court stated: 
The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by 
denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from 
our shores. And many resident aliens have lived in this country longer and 
 
 194.  Id. at 42–43. 
 195.  Id. at 42. 
 196.  Singh v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 197.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 198.  Woodby v.INS., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). 
 199.  Id. at 286. 
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established stronger family, social, and economic ties here than some who have 
become naturalized citizens.200 
Accordingly, the Court held that “no deportation order may be entered 
unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the 
facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.”201 
The Woodby decision was codified in section 240(a)(3)(A) of the INA, 
which states,  
[i]n the proceeding the [Government] has the burden of establishing by clear 
and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to 
the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be 
valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.202   
According to the legislative history cited by the Woodby court: 
“The requirement that the decision of the special inquiry officer shall be based 
on reasonable, substantial and probative evidence means that, where the decision 
rests upon evidence of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable 
person might not have reached the conclusion which was reached, the case may 
not be reversed because the judgment of the appellate body differs from that of 
the administrative body.”203 
To fully understand the government’s clear and convincing burden of 
persuasion under INA section 240(a)(3)(A), this burden, along with the 
requirement that evidence be reasonable, substantial, and probative, must 
be read in context with what the INA requires the government to prove.  
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”204  Therefore, 
the plain language of the statute dictates that the government must prove 
by a high probability or a reasonable certainty that an alien’s underlying 
conviction meets the definition of an aggravated felony through evidence 
“of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable person might 
not have reached the conclusion which was reached.”205 
 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  INA § 240(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 203.  Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 30 (1952). The House 
Report contains substantially identical language. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 57 (1952), 
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653.). 
 204.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 205.  Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284. 
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B.  Clear and Convincing Evidence in Post-Nijhawan Courts 
Post-Nijhawan courts have held that an alien’s admission or stipulation to 
an amount of loss over $10,000 in the plea agreement is sufficient to 
meet the government’s burden of clear and convincing evidence .206  
Similarly, post-Nijhawan courts have allowed the government to rely on 
restitution orders to meet its burden of proof.207  But some courts have 
 
 206.  See Varughese v. Holder, 629 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding alien’s 
admission during plea colloquy to three fraudulent transactions in excess of $10,000 was 
clear and convincing evidence); see also Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 659 F.3d 266, 
276 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the plea agreement, including stipulation that the alien’s 
conduct caused between $120,000 and $200,000 in losses, is clear and convincing 
evidence); see Kawashima v. Holder, 615 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding Mr. 
Kawashima stipulated in his plea agreement that the “total actual tax loss” associated 
with his conviction of submitting a false statement on a tax return was clear and 
convincing evidence of loss); see Carlos-Blaza v. Holder, 611 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the Government established loss by clear and convincing evidence with the 
alien’s stipulation and corresponding restitution order for $65,000); Al-Sharif v. U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 10-1435, 2012 WL 1440225, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 
25, 2012) (“Plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and the 
parties stipulated that the loss attributable to Plaintiff’s crime ‘exceeded $120,000 but was 
less than $200,000.’ . . . Plaintiff’s conviction clearly constitutes an aggravated felony 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).”). 
 207.  See Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding restitution 
order of $350,001 “for [convicted] loss” constituted clear and convincing evidence); see 
also DeGomez v. Holder, 471 F. App’x 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding restitution 
order, supported by alien’s stipulation to $18,594 of loss, was sufficient to meet clear 
and convincing standard); Rivas-Marin v. Holder, 469 F. App’x 521, 522 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding restitution order for $37 million plus alien’s admission to fraudulently inflating 
the value of several real estate properties by more than $100,000 each was clear and 
convincing); see Relvas v. Holder, 382 F. App’x 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The BIA took 
note that Relvas was ordered to pay $106,827.78 in restitution, [] and thus the BIA 
‘engage[d] the evidence he presented’ and provided Relvas with a ‘reasoned analysis’ as 
to why that evidence suggested a loss in excess of $10,000.” (citing Mohideen v. Gonales, 
416 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 2005))); Rosario-Bencosme v. Holder, 424 F. App’x 34, 34–
35 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding restitution order for $5,600,000 resulting from alien’s conviction 
for “acquiring, possessing, using, and redeeming approximately $5,600,000 worth of 
[United States Department of Agriculture] food stamp coupons in a manner contrary to 
[law]” and corroborating statements from alien’s plea colloquy was clear and convincing 
evidence of loss); Pilla v. Holder, 458 F. App’x 518, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the 
restitution order and sentencing memorandum in which the alien admitted to loss 
exceeding $10,000, but less than $30,000 is clear and convincing evidence of loss); see 
Olawale-Ayinde v. Holder, 416 F. App’x 629, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the guilty 
plea, judgment, and restitution order that “specifically referenced only those counts to 
which [the alien] had pled guilty” were sufficient to establish loss by clear and convincing 
evidence); Zmeeva v. Holder, 480 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding restitution 
order of $36,514.52 was sufficient evidence to “support[] the finding that Zmeeva’s 
conviction was an aggravated felony”); Yepes v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F. App’x 320, 
324 (11th Cir. 2012) (allowing consideration of restitution order in determining loss amount 
exceeded $10,000). 
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carelessly accepted restitution orders that encompass unconvicted conduct 
to equate to clear and convincing evidence.208  Additionally, courts have 
accepted information in an alien’s plea agreement regarding loss and 
statements made by the alien during the plea colloquy to assist the 
government in satisfying its burden of proving loss by clear and convincing 
evidence.209  This often occurs where the same amount of loss is stated in 
the indictment, guilty plea, and sentence order.210  Even factual allegations 
regarding loss contained in an alien’s criminal information have been 
held to constitute clear and convincing evidence.211  Some courts, however, 
have limited the admission of the criminal information to the situation 
where the alien was convicted of (or pled guilty to) all of the counts 
contained in the indictment.212 
Some courts have allowed the use of PSRs, but most limit such use 
only to corroborate factual allegations in other documents, such as the plea 
 
 208. See Ragbir, 389 F. App’x at 83–84 (noting that restitution in a fraud case can 
include compensation for uncharged conduct closely related to the scheme); see also 
Mahfouz v. Holder, 400 F. App’x 165, 166 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA’s holding 
that the restitution order attributing losses caused by the alien and co-conspirators was 
“substantial evidence” of loss and sufficient to removed alien under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i)); Ezeigwe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 491 U.S. 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[A]lthough Ezeigwe’s restitution order operates as a civil judgment for enforcement 
purposes, it does not change the underlying criminal nature of the restitution. [Because] 
Ezeigwe does not dispute that he agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $100,000 at 
the plea hearing[, . . . the Court was] satisfied that the loss amount was tethered to the 
actual conviction in this case.”). 
 209. See Chhabra v. Holder, 444 F. App’x 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he plea 
colloquy, and the guilty plea itself all clearly indicate that the amount of revenue loss to 
the United States Government exceeded $42,000.”); see also In re Sampathkumar, 2010 
WL 3780676, at *4 (B.I.A. 2010) (“Under Nijhawan, we hold that [the plea colloquy] is 
sufficient to satisfy the loss requirement of section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, even 
though it may have included losses relating to other misconduct as well as that in the 
count of conviction.” (emphasis added)). 
 210. See Ibe v. Holder, 406 F. App’x 23, 26 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 211. See Rosario-Bencosme, 424 F. App’x at 35 (“There is ‘nothing unfair’ about 
the BIA’s determination that the Government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the 
requisite loss by clear and convincing evidence when it presented the criminal information 
and restitution order.”); see also Masoud v. Holder, 487 F. App’x 633, 636 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 212.  See Orozco De Anda v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 588, 590 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding 
the guilty plea to conduct that was explicitly tied to $1.3 million in loss clear and convincing); 
Bazuaye v. Holder, 452 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding the PSR and restitution 
order were clear and convincing evidence of loss exceeding $10,000); DeMedeiros v. 
Holder, 461 F. App’x 633, 635 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the state court certified 
information and abstract of judgment were clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s 
victims suffered more than $10,000 of loss). 
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agreement, judgment of conviction, restitution order, or criminal 
information.213  A few courts have improvidently allowed an unchallenged 
PSR alone to satisfy the government’s burden of clear and convincing 
evidence.214 
C.  Misapplication of the Nijhawan Holding to Shift the                        
Burden of Persuasion 
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a 
sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence 
report as a finding of fact.”215  This sentencing rule should not be taken as 
an invitation to shift the burden of persuasion to the alien defendant in a 
deportation proceeding. 
Regrettably, in applying the circumstance-specific analysis, some courts 
allow the government to satisfy its burden of persuasion and establish 
the amount of loss by relying solely on an uncontested PSR.216  In 
doing so, these courts justify accepting the government’s minimal showing 
of evidence as clear and convincing so long as the alien had at least one 
“‘fair opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction 
involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.’”217  However, an 
immigration court’s rubber-stamping of any unchallenged evidence the 
government presents should not necessarily amount to clear and convincing 
evidence in deportation proceedings.  Instead, these courts, in such 
 
 213.  See Ragbir, 389 F. App’x at 83–84 (accepting the Government’s offer of an 
unchallenged PSR, together with the indictment and judgment of conviction, to establish 
loss by clear and convincing evidence); Kaplun v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 
266 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that the PSR and criminal information alleging that the 
alien’s conviction of securities fraud caused nearly $900,000 of loss  was clear and 
convincing); Rodney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 393 F. App’x 859, 861 (3d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2883 (2011) (holding that the PSR and restitution order are sufficient 
to support the finding that the alien caused a loss of $23,450.21); Tian v. Holder, 576 
F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that the plea agreement, PSR, and restitution order 
meet the clear and convincing standard). 
 214.  See Munez-Morales v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 379 F. App’x 210, 217 (3d Cir. 
2010) (finding that the PSR alone was enough for clear and convincing evidence because 
the court was not “made aware of the existence of any other evidence that is alleged to 
contradict the [PSR] . . .”); Familia v. U.S. Atty Gen., 507 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 
2012) (using the PSR to find that loss exceeded $10,000).                                                               
 215.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A); see Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 213 (noting that 
the sentencing court expressly adopted the facts of the PSR); see Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266 
(noting that the loss in PSR was adopted by the district court). 
 216.  See Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 178–79; see also Munez-Morales v. 
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 379 F. App’x 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2010); Familia v. U.S. Atty Gen., 
507 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 217.  Ibe v. Holder, 406 F. App’x 23, 28 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). 
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situations, may be in reality impermissibly shifting the burden of persuasion 
to the alien respondent, and thereby requiring the alien respondent to 
successfully rebut the charges against him, regardless of whether the 
government has actually met its mandated burden of persuasion. 
An even more disturbing trend is the increase in immigration courts 
that have found clear and convincing evidence where the alien fails to 
produce evidence that conflicts with the government’s evidence.  These 
courts, relying on Nijhawan, have ordered deportation in “‘the absence 
of any conflicting evidence.’”218  The Supreme Court’s language in 
Nijhawan, that “[t]hese considerations, taken together, mean that petitioner 
and those in similar circumstances have at least one and possibly two 
opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the earlier sentencing 
and the second at the deportation hearing itself,”219 does not support this 
conclusion.  Such commentary merely identifies the ability for the alien to 
present evidence in response.  Any attempt to shift the ultimate burden of 
persuasion away from the government, which creates a presumption of 
removability that an alien must rebut, is fundamentally wrong.   
This befuddled, unjustified acceptance of the government’s untrustworthy 
and unrebutted evidence has now become routine.  For example, this 
improper burden-shifting approach might indeed be present in Kaplun v. 
Attorney General, wherein the Third Circuit says that the Government 
satisfied its burden with “unrebutted evidence” and specifically pointed to 
“the documented lack of objection” to a PSR as clear and convincing 
evidence.220  Another example might have occurred in Munez-Morales 
v. Attorney General,221 in which the court’s decision relied on the 
Government’s sole piece of evidence, an undisputed PSR.   The Third 
Circuit held that the alien’s failure to object to statements contained in the 
PSR during the presentencing hearing and the lack of contradictory 
evidence met the clear and convincing standard in a subsequent removal 
proceeding.222  The courts should not allow the government to satisfy 
its burden of persuasion through the use of unreliable evidence just 
 
 218.  Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 43). 
 219.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. 
 220.  Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 273. 
 221.  379 F. App’x 210. 
 222.  Id. at 216–17. 
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because the alien does not object or introduce evidence conflicting with 
the government’s evidence.223 
Any shift of the burden, whether intentional or not, is a sweeping 
misapplication of the Supreme Court’s holding in Woodby and Nijhawan, 
and is not permitted under the INA.  The law is well-defined—when the 
government moves to deport a legal permanent alien residing in the United 
States under M(i), it is the government’s burden, and the government’s 
alone, to produce reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence that the 
alien’s underlying conviction caused over $10,000 in actual losses by clear 
and convincing evidence.224  Though immigration proceedings are civil 
in nature, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized “the unique nature 
of deportation” as a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”225  In fact, the Supreme 
Court recently acknowledged that “‘[p]reserving the [alien’s] right 
to remain in the United States may be more important to the [alien] than 
 
 223.  See Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Ragbir points 
to nothing in the record that precluded the agency, as a matter of law, from making a 
clear and convincing finding that the $350,001 restitution order included more than 
$10,000 attributable to the crimes of conviction.”); Rosario-Bencosme v. Holder, 424 F. 
App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that “[t]here is ‘nothing unfair’ about the BIA’s 
determination that the government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the requisite loss 
by clear and convincing evidence when it presented the criminal information and restitution 
order, and Rosario–Bencosme did not present any conflicting evidence” (emphasis added) 
(citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42)); Orozco De Anda v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 588, 590–
91 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the government introduced clear and convincing evidence that 
the funds involved here were ‘tied to the specific count[ ] covered by the conviction,’ . . . 
and Orozco has failed to point to any evidence that rebuts this fact.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42)); Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 217 (“Given that 
Munez–Morales had ample opportunity to object to any factual findings he considered 
improper and failed to do so, and given that we have not been made aware of the existence of 
any other evidence that is alleged to contradict the pre-sentencing report’s estimate that 
over $400,000 was laundered, we can find no fault with the Board’s conclusion that 
there was clear and convincing evidence that the amount of money laundered by the 
conspirators exceeded $10,000.” (emphasis added)); Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266 (“[T]he 
absence of any objections to the PSR by Kaplun, and the absence of any conflicting 
evidence (and [Kaplun] mentions none), this evidence is clear and convincing.” (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 43)); Rodney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 
393 F. App’x 859, 861 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Rodney did not challenge the content of the PSR 
at his sentencing before Judge Marrero, who then ordered him to pay restitution to Fleet 
Bank in the amount of $23,450.21. App. 394. This evidence is sufficient to establish that 
Rodney caused an actual loss to Fleet Bank of more than $10,000, [and] that he was 
therefore convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . .”); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 896 
(8th Cir. 2009) (“Tian has not identified any evidence indicating that the portion of the 
investigative costs attributable to his unauthorized access to a computer came to $10,000 
or less. As a result, we conclude that the IJ and the BIA correctly determined that Tian’s 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony.”). 
 224.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 225.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)). 
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any potential jail sentence.’”226  The Supreme Court’s understanding that 
legal permanent residents are deserving of heightened constitutional 
protection directly translates to the varying standards of proof under the 
INA. 
D.  A PSR Should Never Be Considered Clear and                            
Convincing Evidence 
The government’s prolific and unsettling use of PSRs in removal 
proceedings has, on occasion, received the tacit approval of the immigration 
courts and the federal circuits since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Nijhawan.  Yet these courts fail to realize that this use of PSRs falls outside 
any notion of fairness and should never be considered reliable evidence 
(let alone clear and convincing evidence) that an alien’s underlying criminal 
conviction was an aggravated felony.  Moreover, with the exception of 
the Fifth Circuit’s Arguelles-Olivares decision, most federal circuits prior to 
Nijhawan condemned the use of PSRs to establish the amount of loss 
occasioned by the defendant’s conduct.227 
When rejecting the use of PSRs, most courts criticized them as inherently 
unreliable228 and as insufficient evidence to satisfy the government’s clear 
and convincing burden of persuasion in an immigration context.229  The 
Second Circuit summed up the inherent untrustworthiness of a PSR as 
follows: 
The PSR is a tool used in aid of sentencing, and typically describes conduct that 
demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the alien was never convicted for 
that activity. . . . Because the factual narratives contained in the PSR are 
prepared by a probation officer on the basis of interviews with prosecuting attorneys, 
police officers, law enforcement agents, etc., they may well be inaccurate. They 
 
 226.  Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 368). 
 227.  See supra Parts IV.A–IV.D. 
 228.  See Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Lara-
Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); John P. Fullam, Coping With 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 335, 335–36 (1998) (“For a variety of 
reasons, unreliable and exaggerated estimates can find their way into Presentence Reports, 
and defense counsel may be reluctant to object, for fear of jeopardizing the credit for 
complete acceptance of responsibility.”). 
 229.  See Dickson, 346 F.3d at 53–54; United States v. Valenzuela-Hernandez, 72 
F. App’x 686, 686 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Solis-Torres, 16 F. App’x 1, 2 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“The bare statements in the PSR do not amount to the clear and convincing 
evidence necessary to support his sentencing enhancement.”). 
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may include allegations that were not proven at trial, as well as alleged facts 
that would have been inadmissible at trial had the prosecution attempted to 
present them.230 
According to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he 
probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a 
report to the court before it imposes sentence” on the convicted 
defendant.231 A PSR often contains additional legal and factual information 
referring to the defendant’s criminal] history, financial impact on the victim,  
and when a legal bases for restitution exists, information sufficient for a 
restitution order.”232  None of this additional information is proven in the 
previous criminal proceeding; in fact, it is usually background information 
drawn from probation officers’ own interviews that “describes conduct 
that demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the alien was never 
convicted for that activity.”233  And while unconvicted and even acquitted 
conduct may be pertinent for sentencing purposes,234 the use of “unproven 
(and sometimes inadmissible) facts [are] an inappropriate basis on which to 
rest a removal decision.”235  Otherwise, an alien may be removed based 
upon unconvicted conduct or because the alien failed to effectively dispute 
certain inculpatory facts at the sentencing hearing. 
An immigration court’s consideration of “unconvicted facts” contained in 
the PSR also improperly allows the government to shirk its burden of 
proving removability by clear and convincing evidence.  During the 
sentencing hearing, once a defendant objects to factual statements in a 
PSR, the sentencing court may then only rely on those facts if the 
government proves them by a preponderance of the evidence.236  Once 
the government proves the additional facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the sentencing court may accept them as findings of fact. As 
previously mentioned, the same is true for an undisputed section of the 
PSR.237  While this may be the rule in the sentencing context, immigration 
courts should not be permitted to rely on the PSR to establish the amount 
of loss for deportation purposes. 
 
 230.  Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54; see also Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 
1998) (noting that it is “virtually inevitable” for PSRs to contain inaccurate information 
and hearsay statements). 
 231.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). 
 232.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(D). 
 233.  Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54. 
 234.  Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 235.  Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 
2007) (citing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54). 
 236.  See United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 237.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A). 
DEVITT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2016  5:18 PM 
[VOL. 15:  1, 2013]  Nijhawan v. Holder 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 41 
The government’s push to use documents outside of the record of 
conviction lends credence to a more deliberate strategy to avoid its 
heightened burden of proof. What is even more regrettable is the Third 
Circuit’s acceptance of this impermissible lower standard of proof.  In 
Munez-Morales, the Third Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Nijhawan as “reject[ing] any artificial limit on the evidentiary sources 
to which the court can look in determining whether the government has 
carried [its] burden.”238  This is simply not an accurate portrayal of 
Nijhawan.  Although the Supreme Court refused to accept Nijhawan’s 
suggested limits, it never condoned the use of a PSR to justify removal.  
The use of a fully admitted stipulation to prove the amount of loss is wholly 
distinguishable from the use of a PSR.  Indeed, the entirety of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Nijhawan was that, given the lack of any conflicting 
evidence, the petitioner’s own stipulation to a loss considerably greater 
than $10,000 and the criminal trial court’s restitution order showing the 
same amount constituted clear and convincing evidence.239  Nothing more 
and nothing less was noted.  The government has incorrectly construed 
Nijhawan to support its use of any document it can gather from the alien’s 
criminal file. 
VII.  WHAT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE USED TO PROVE LOSS UNDER M(I)? 
A. Implementing a Four-Phase Procedural Framework: Ensuring                
Due Process Procedures and Allowing Admission                                                   
of Only Reliable Evidence 
Courts should not be bashful in defining the precise scope of the 
circumstance-specific inquiry under two important governing principles (as 
first noted above): 
1. The government must be given a fair opportunity to satisfy 
its burden of persuasion that the dollar threshold under 
M(i) has been satisfied, consistent with due process afforded 
to the alien, fairness, and Supreme Court dictates; and 
 
 238.  Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 216 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 
41–43 (2009)). 
 239.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42–43. 
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2.   The alien respondent must be given a fair opportunity to 
dispute any such governmental argument that the monetary 
threshold has been satisfied. 
Adoption of one of these procedural guarantees does not presuppose the 
exclusion of the other; both can be present in a fair and balanced approach. 
This article attempts to provide a sensible four-phase framework. 
Phase One (Presentation of Government Evidence): This initial phase 
allows the government to present to the immigration judge credible 
evidence from the underlying criminal file in an attempt to satisfy its 
burden of persuasion.  Such evidence should be limited to Reliable and 
Usable Evidence, as defined above.  This list of usable evidence gives 
flexibility to the government by allowing proof outside of what is normally 
considered part of the conviction record; the government can thus not 
only use a plea colloquy under this method, but also may use defendant 
admissions, trial court sentencing orders, and trial court restitution orders.  
This is not, however, an open invitation for the government to bring in 
anything found in the criminal file.  Such inquiry should be limited to those 
documents identified as Reliable and Usable Evidence.  Permitting evidence 
outside these documents puts the alien in an untenable position to combat in 
minitrials the unreliable information paraded before the immigration 
judge. 
Phase Two (The Tethering Requirement): This phase mandates that 
the government show from the Reliable and Usable Evidence submitted 
that the damage is specifically tethered to the actual conviction.  This is one 
of the central requirements of the circumstance-specific analysis enunciated 
in Nijhawan.240  As previously mentioned, the aggravated felony provision 
of the INA predicates removal on the basis of a convicted offense.241  
Accordingly, using the circumstance-specific analysis of the monetary 
threshold under M(i), the only way removal continues to be predicated upon 
a convicted offense is through the tethering of the loss to the conviction.242 
Even prior to Nijhawan, both the Seventh and Third Circuit reasoned 
that “the ‘loss’ must ‘be tied to the specific counts  covered by the 
conviction.’”243  Unlike the stipulation in Nijhawan, the stipulation in 
Knutsen included conduct that was not limited to the loss caused by the 
 
 240.  Id. at 42. 
 241.  See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (providing 
that any “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable”). 
 242.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 40–41, 42 (rejecting Nijhawan’s argument to adopt 
a modified-categorical approach). 
 243.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citing Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733, 739–40 
(7th Cir. 2005) and Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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actual offense of conviction; therefore, it was error for the immigration 
judge and the BIA to rely on the alien’s stipulation as proof of the actual 
loss.244   However, after Nijhawan, courts became less rigid in holding the 
government to the tethering requirement.  Especially when cases became 
more complicated, i.e., when an alien is charged with multiple counts, 
but not convicted for all of the counts, courts have erroneously begun to 
use the amount of loss for the entire scheme as clear and convincing 
evidence of the actual loss caused by the individual alien.245 
Additionally, even the Government’s position in Nijhawan supports 
the view that the loss inquiry is limited to the evidence tethered to the 
criminal conviction. The Government agreed that any inquiry into the 
underlying facts must be “tied to the specific counts covered by the 
conviction.”246 
Phase Three (Full and Fair Opportunity for Alien to Contest): This 
phase provides the alien respondent a fair procedural opportunity to 
challenge the government’s claim that the monetary threshold has been 
satisfied under M(i).  The Supreme Court in Nijhawan specifically 
acknowledged this right, indicating that the INA removal statute “foresees 
the use of fundamentally fair procedures.”247  This would include a “fair 
opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction involved 
a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.”248 
Phase Four (Immigration Judge Assessment): This phase requires 
the immigration judge to critically assess the evidence, taking into 
consideration the government’s heightened burden of persuasion, with 
an eye toward determining the actual loss for the convicted offence.  For 
example, the immigration judge cannot take as absolute proof the amount 
stated in the restitution order.  Indeed, as admitted by the Government 
during oral argument in Nijhawan, the loss calculated for criminal 
sentencing does not equate to the loss for deportation purposes: 
Justice Alito: . . . [D]oes the government have a theory about how the loss is 
measured for purposes of this statute?  Under the sentencing guidelines, the loss 
was a very complicated calculation, lots of rules about relevant conduct and lots 
of cases and different ways of proving loss, and here we just have the statute. 
 
 244.  Nijhawan v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,523 F.3d 387, 396 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 
Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739). 
 245.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 659 F.3d 266, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 246.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. 
 247.  Id. at 41. 
 248.  Id. 
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[Government Lawyer]: Yes, we think that it is not necessarily the same as the 
loss determination that would be made for sentencing.  And so, the board has 
made it very clear that even though a restitution order, for example, can be sufficient 
evidence of loss to the victim, that it needs to be assessed with an eye to exactly 
what losses were determined in the underlying restitution order and with regard 
to the burden of proof there.249 
The Government further conceded that the restitution order and even a 
criminal defendant stipulation to such order is not dispositive in a 
deportation hearing: 
[Government Lawyer]: Well, I—I think that we are not taking the position that 
the—the stipulation for sentencing purposes, which was pursuant to (6)(B) of 
the guidelines and was for stipulation purposes—we’re not arguing that that 
is—is dispositive in the—in the civil removal proceeding.250 
The Government also seems to acknowledge the difficultly of proving 
removal under M(i) even with the “easy” facts presented in Nijhawan: 
[Government Lawyer]: Well, I—if we had that amount of evidence in this case, 
we had sentencing stipulations and all sorts of determinations at the time of the 
sentencing where the defendant did not even try to argue that this wasn’t 
actually the amount of loss associated with his offense and conviction, then we 
probably would be able to establish by clear and convincing . . ..251 
Adoption of this four-phase procedural framework would give all 
parties a much-needed certainty in future matters.  The government would 
know exactly what it could draw upon as admissible evidence and the alien 
and his criminal lawyer would, at the criminal trial stage, know the exact 
ramifications of admitting to the truth of any of these documents. 
B.  A Circumstance-Specific Analysis Does Not Warrant a                   
Minitrial for the Admission of Newly                                                            
Created Evidence 
In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court noted “that the ‘sole purpose’ of the 
‘aggravated felony’ inquiry ‘is to ascertain the nature of a prior conviction; 
it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.’”252  But the Court 
left the door open a crack for a circumstance-specific inquiry to ascertain 
the actual factual circumstances surrounding the individual’s conviction 
and the resulting loss. 
Given the opportunity, the government would remove the door entirely 
and allow newly created evidence to flood the immigration court.  Under 
 
 249.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 28–29. 
 250.  Id. at 32. 
 251.  Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 252.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 44). 
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this process, both parties would be equally able to engage in discovery, call 
witnesses, present new evidence, and examine the opposing party’s 
evidence.  But anyone familiar with our Nation’s overburdened immigration 
courts would recognize this as a procedural fantasy and would realize that 
this puts the alien in an unfair position.253  As the Supreme Court pointed 
out in a recent decision on a different aggravated felony provision, forcing a 
noncitizen respondent to relitigate the factual circumstances surrounding 
his conviction puts the noncitizen at a severe disadvantage since 
“noncitizens are not guaranteed legal representation and are often subject 
to mandatory detention.”254  Incorporating a limitless factual inquiry into the 
noncitizen’s criminal conviction in the immigration proceeding is at odds 
with the longstanding principle that “the relevant INA provisions ask 
what the noncitizen was ‘convicted of,’ not what he did, and the inquiry in 
immigration proceedings is limited accordingly.”255 
The Supreme Court recently reiterated in Moncrieffe v. Holder its 
disapproval of “relitigati[ng] . . . past convictions in minitrials conducted 
long after the fact.”256  Allowing minitrials during immigration proceedings 
would convert such proceedings into the “post hoc investigation into the 
facts of predicate offenses that [the Supreme Court has] long deemed 
undesirable.”257  In Moncrieffe, the Government relied on Nijhawan in its 
argument that “[n]oncitizens should be given an opportunity during 
immigration proceedings to demonstrate that their predicate marijuana 
distribution convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and 
no remuneration, just as a federal criminal defendant could do at 
sentencing.”258  The Supreme Court rejected the Government’s proposed 
minitrials as “entirely inconsistent with both the INA’s  text and the 
categorical approach,” since they would only frustrate the primary and 
“practical” purpose of the categorical approach, to promote “judicial and 
administrative efficiency.”259  Although lambasting the Government for 
suggesting “case-specific factfinding,” which would only invite  the 
“potential unfairness” that the system has long sought to avoid, the Court 
 
 253.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013). 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
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does leave some wiggle room by way of dicta as to whether such a minitrial 
would be appropriate in the circumstance-specific examination context.260 
I would strongly urge that the already-mentioned procedural and 
substantive concerns that counsel against minitrials apply equally to the 
circumstance-specific analysis.  Without any real limitation on the type of 
evidence the government can present or a means of leveling the playing 
field for the detained respondent, an inquiry into the factual circumstances 
of a conviction will allow the government to satisfy its burden by pointing 
to any document it might find, irrespective of its reliability, authenticity, 
and relationship to the noncitizen’s actual conviction.  
One indication that this view is more appropriate is the underlying Third 
Circuit opinion in Nijhawan, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.261  
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit determined that the 
monetary threshold of subparagraph M(i) was not an element of the 
offense.262  Still, the Third Circuit referenced “the prior criminal record” 
at several points throughout the opinion.263  Just as the Supreme Court did, 
the Third Circuit held that the determination of loss requires the court to 
“examine the facts at issue.”264  However, the Third Circuit expressly 
limited the inquiry into the facts as evidenced in the prior criminal 
record.265 
 Furthermore, the tension among the circuits, which led to the Supreme 
Court granting certiorari, primarily involved the extent of inquiry into 
the prior criminal record.266  The most limited inquiry, used by the Ninth 
 
 260.  Id. at 1690–91. 
 261.  See Nijhawan v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 262.  Id. at 391–92; Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 29 (2009). 
 263.  See, e.g., Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 391 (“The issue remains, however, whether 
the language ‘in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000’ requires that a 
jury have actually convicted defendant of a loss in excess of $10,000, . . . or permits 
resort to the prior criminal record in order to determine what loss was in fact occasioned 
by or attributable to the offense of conviction.”) (emphasis added); id. at 395 (“[H]ere, 
we need only determine whether the record is sufficiently clear that the loss resulting 
from the convicted conduct exceeds $10,000.”) (emphasis added); id. (noting that it is 
not the only “court of appeals to have viewed the inquiry into the record of conviction to 
permit examination of loss not specifically admitted in the plea colloquy or agreement or 
found by a jury as part of the conviction”) (emphasis added); id. at 397 (“[W]e endorse 
careful consideration of the record to determine whether it is sufficiently clear that the 
loss connected to the crime of conviction exceeded $10,000.”); id. at 399 (“It is well 
within the competence of a court to examine the record for clear and convincing evidence 
of loss caused by the conduct of conviction.”) (emphasis added). 
 264.  Id. at 393–94. 
 265.  See id. at 391. 
 266.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 33 (recognizing that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have 
[reached] different conclusions as to whether the $10,000 threshold in subparagraph 
(M)(i) refers to an element of a fraud statute or to the factual circumstances surrounding 
commission of the crime on a specific occasion” and listing the relevant circuits to 
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Circuit, prohibited examination into the prior criminal record where the 
underlying offense did not include an appropriate monetary threshold.267  
The most lenient approach, used by the Fifth Circuit, allowed the 
Government to prove loss by presenting a PSR.268  But under either side of 
this spectrum, the government was never afforded a wide-open trial; only 
evidence from the underlying criminal conviction was considered. 
 In Matter of Babaisakov, the BIA analyzed both the scope and reliability 
of evidence that may be used to establish the monetary threshold.269 
In doing so, the BIA correctly rejected use of the modified categorical 
approach270 and shifted its analysis to the evidence contained in the 
record of conviction.271   Eventually, the BIA concluded that any evidence 
relied upon “must be assessed with an eye to what losses are covered and to 
the burden of proof employed.”272   In other words, the BIA was concerned 
with the burden imposed on the government and ensuring that the victim’s 
loss is established by clear and convincing evidence.273   Specifically, the 
 
compare). Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nijhawan, every circuit court to 
consider the issue limited the inquiry of loss to the prior criminal and sentencing proceeding.  
See, e.g., Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the use of a 
PSR to determine loss, but allowing an indictment, judgment indicating loss, and 
restitution order); Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 395 (permitting loss to be evidenced by the 
defendant’s stipulation of loss during sentencing, judgment of conviction, and restitution 
order); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2008) (permitting 
loss to be established solely by a PSR); Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting inquiry into both a PSR and restitution 
order and requiring loss to be established by facts to which the defendant actually and 
necessarily pleaded, as indicated by a charging document, written plea agreement, or 
plea colloquy transcript); Kawashima v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(prohibiting the record of conviction from being consulted entirely where the underlying 
criminal offense did not include an element of loss in excess of $10,000); Obasohan v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 791 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a restitution order and 
requiring loss to be established by the criminal information, plea, judgment or sentence). 
 267.  See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1117. 
 268.  See Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 179. 
 269.  Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 307 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 270.  Id. at 316–18. 
 271.  Id. at 318–20. 
 272.  Id. at 319.  The Supreme Court quoted the BIA on this point in the Nijhawan 
opinion. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009) (“[T]he Board of Immigration Appeals, 
too, has recognized that immigration judges must assess findings made at sentencing 
‘with an eye to what losses are covered and to the burden of proof employed.’” (Babaisakov, 
24 I. & N. Dec. at 319)). 
 273.  See Babaisakoy, 24 I. & N Dec. at 319–20.  The BIA also explained that the 
amount of loss will suffice to meet a clear and convincing showing only if the loss 
resulted from the conduct related to the particular charges or criminal counts covered by 
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BIA contended that the record of conviction was “an uncertain source of 
reliable information on loss to the victim” because such records sometimes 
contain facts proved only by a preponderance of the evidence standard.274  
 Despite the BIA’s stated concerns with the reliability of evidence and 
holding the government to its burden of proof, the language of its opinion 
seems to leave open the possibility of a minitrial where newly created 
evidence is submitted.275  Given the current state of the law, however, 
reliance upon the BIA’s decision in Matter of Babaisakov for the 
proposition that there are no limitations on what the immigration judge 
may consider during the factual circumstance inquiry is misplaced.276  The 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of the BIA opinion only referred to the 
section instructing courts how to determine loss using the “record of 
conviction”277 and thus limited its approval of the BIA’s decision to the 
admonition to immigration judges to “assess findings made at sentencing 
‘with an eye to what losses are covered and to the burden of proof 
employed.’”278  No justification exists to allow a wide-open trial before 
the immigration judge determines the amount of loss from the conviction. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is understandable that a federal statutory mechanism exists for the 
deportation of legal resident aliens engaged in extreme wrongful behavior.  
Congress has thus decided (through the INA) that a “noncitizen who has 
been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ may be deported from this 
country.”279  Such allegations are quite serious, especially since, if proved, 
they take away all discretionary relief from removal “no  matter how 
compelling” the case may be.280 
 
the conviction. Id. at 320 (citing Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107–08 
(3d Cir. 2006)) (proposing that “even a plea to a fraudulent transaction exceeding $10,000, or 
a sentencing fact found beyond a reasonable doubt, may be suspect if the admission or 
sentencing factor covered losses associated with transactions outside the particular count 
or counts covered by the conviction”). 
 274.  Id. at 320–21 (noting that the record may contain sufficient evidence of loss, 
but that it is not always the case).  
 275.  See id. at 321 (“[W]e discern no sound reason for prohibiting Immigration 
Judges from considering other reliable evidence that bears on this question, including but 
not limited to the testimonial admissions of the respondent made during the removal 
hearing.”). 
 276.  See id. 
 277.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42; Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 319. 
 278.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citing Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 319). 
 279.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 280.  Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1682. 
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With so much at stake, we must be ever mindful that even noncitizens 
have both a statutory and constitutional right to a full and fair hearing.281  
“[I]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything 
upon insufficient evidence.”282  In sum, I find no justification for the 
government to use new evidence not in the original criminal conviction file; 
and I find no support for the government to forage the criminal defendant’s 
criminal file in hopes of finding something, even untrustworthy documents, 
that announce the minimum damage threshold for deportation.  In our 
system, a napkin found in the criminal file with $10,001 claimed damages 
scribbled on it should never suffice. 
281.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); INA § 239(a)(1)(D),  8 U.S.C.  
§ 1229(a)(1)(D) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2012).
 282.  WILLIAM K. CLIFFORD, The Ethics of Belief (1877), in THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 70 (Timothy J. Madigan ed., 1999). 
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